But they did not know

Everybody complains about SHA-1.
I'm so glad that I store passwords in plain text.

;-)

Google: this sha-1 collision is really gonna fuck up the internet more than anything else today

Cloudflare: hold my beer

CloudBleed

Me: Browsing the security of a website.

Tell the website developer that they are using the SHA-1 hashing algorithm for encrypting the credentials of it's registered users.

Them: Yeah, so what?

Me: You shouldn't be using an algorithm which was exploited years ago in the age of 2016.

Them: Don't worry, nothing will happen.

Me: *facepalm*

Google researchers breaks SHA-1. Next 90 days they will release the code that was used to break this encryption.

Are we fucked?

SHA-1 was just "broken" and Dovecot still defaults to un-salted MD5 ?!?!

I saved passwords to db hashed to SHA-1 with no salt... I left that company but I'm sure that application is still actively used today.

OpenSSH 8.2 is out. This release removes support for the ssh-rsa key algorithm. The better alternatives include:

1. RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These algorithms have the advantage of using the same key type as "ssh-rsa" but use the safe SHA-2 hash algorithms (now used by default if the client and server support them).

2. The ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm.

3. ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521.

In this release, support for FIDO/U2F hardware tokens. Also noteworthy, a future release of OpenSSH will enable UpdateHostKeys by default to allow the client to automatically migrate to better algorithms.

OpenSSH has announced plans to drop support for it's SHA-1 authentication method.

According to the report of ZDNet : The OpenSSH team currently considered SHA-1 hashing algorithm insecure (broken in real-world attack in February 2017 when Google cryptographers disclosed SHAttered attack which could make two different files appear as they had the same SHA-1 file signature). The OpenSSH project will be disabling the 'ssh-rsa' (which uses SHA-1) mode by default in a future release, they also plan to enable the 'UpdateHostKeys' feature by default which allow servers to automatically migrate from the old 'ssh-rsa' mode to better authentication algorithms.

Crypto. I've seen some horrible RC4 thrown around and heard of 3DES also being used, but luckily didn't lay my eyes upon it.
Now to my current crypto adventure.
Rule no.1: Never roll your own crypto.
They said.
So let's encrypt a file for upload. OK, there doesn't seem to be a clear standard, but ya'know combine asymmetric cipher to crypt the key with a symmetric. Should be easy. Take RSA and whatnot from some libraries. But let's obfuscate it a bit so nobody can reuse it. - Until today I thought the crypto was alright, but then there was something off. On two layers there were added hashes, timestamps or length fields, which enlarges the data to encrypt. Now it doesn't add up any more: Through padding and hash verification RSA from OpenSSL throws an error, because the data is too long (about 240 bytes possible, but 264 pumped in). Probably the lib used just didn't notify, silently truncating stuff or resorting to other means. Still investigation needed. - but apart from that: why the fuck add own hash verification, with weak non-cryptographic hashes(!) if the chosen RSA variant already has that with SHA-256. Why this sick generation of key material with some md5 artistic stunts - is there no cryptographically safe random source on Windows? Why directly pump some structs (with no padding and magic numbers) into the file? Just so it's a bit more fucked up?
Thanks, that worked.